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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION                             
IN THE ERA OF OIRA 
Lisa Heinzerling* 
In recent years, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has asserted 
a remarkable degree of authority over administrative agencies’ rulemaking 
processes.  One of the ways in which OIRA has exercised power over 
agencies has been to foist upon them its own views about the requirements 
of the statutes under which they operate.  The most notable trend in this 
area has been OIRA’s insistence on converting technology-based environ-
mental laws into cost-benefit laws.  In OIRA’s hands, for example, the 
Clean Water Act1
I will argue that this transformation is illegal.  Given the plain language 
of the statute, it would be illegal even if the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA)—the agency charged with implementing the Act—had cho-
sen this course.  But EPA did not choose this course; OIRA did.  OIRA’s 
role in transforming EPA’s understanding of the Act robs EPA’s interpreta-
tion of any deference it might have been given under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
 (the “Act”) is being transformed from a technology-
based regime into a cost-benefit regime.   
2
I use the Clean Water Act, and in particular a rule governing cooling wa-
ter towers for power plants, as my case study.  But the analysis applies 
whenever OIRA foists upon an administrative agency an interpretation of a 
statute that the agency has Congressional authority to administer.  When 
OIRA’s interpretation, not the agency’s, prevails, the agency’s reluctant 
embrace of OIRA’s views does not deserve the deference Chevron might 
otherwise afford. 
  if EPA itself had chosen the 
interpretation. 
Part I of this article provides background on OIRA, the Clean Water Act, 
 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  This article draws upon an amicus 
brief I wrote (on a pro bono basis) for OMB Watch in the case challenging the Clean Water 
Act rule discussed in detail here.  I am grateful to Robert Rosing and David Tarr for their 
excellent research assistance. 
 1. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2006). 
 2. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
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and EPA’s rulemaking on cooling water towers.  Part II discusses why 
EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act in the proceeding on cooling 
water towers was in error and why, given OIRA’s deep involvement, 
EPA’s interpretation does not deserve Chevron deference. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
OIRA is situated within the OMB.  Created by the Paperwork Reduction 
Act of 1980,3 OIRA has the authority to monitor and reduce the paperwork 
burden of the federal government and private entities.4  OIRA also over-
sees the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act, which creates special procedural 
rules for Congress’s consideration of legislation having certain specified 
effects on obligations of states and local governments;5 the Information 
Quality Act, which aims at ensuring the reliability of information dissemi-
nated by the federal agencies;6 and the Small Business Regulatory En-
forcement Fairness Act, which requires agencies to consider the effects of 
their actions on the nation’s small businesses.7  Under the Regulatory 
Right-to-Know Act, OIRA is also required to publish an annual report on 
the costs and benefits of federal regulation.8
Yet, in terms of influence, none of OIRA’s statutory obligations has sur-
passed the authority given to it under two different Executive Orders.  The 
first, Executive Order 12,291,
 
9 which was issued by President Reagan in 
1981, required OIRA to oversee compliance with the Executive Order’s 
new requirement that agency regulations costing $100 million or more be 
subject to a cost-benefit analysis.10  The second, President Clinton’s Execu-
tive Order 12,866, superseded Executive Order 12,291 in 1993.11  Execu-
tive Order 12,866 is similar in many respects to the Order it displaced; it, 
too, requires cost-benefit analysis for major agency regulations and gives 
OIRA oversight authority regarding agencies’ cost-benefit analyses.12
 
 3. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3503 (West 2006).  Section 3503 establishes OIRA.  Id. 
  
 4. § 3504 (enumerating the Director of OIRA’s responsibilities). 
 5. 2 U.S.C.A. § 1501 (West 2006). 
 6. Information Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). 
 7. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 
§ 201, 110 Stat. 847 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808). 
 8. Regulatory Right-to-Know Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 624, 114 Stat. 2763. 
 9. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 12. Id. at 51,737; Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193. 
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Moreover, Executive Order 12,866, like Executive Order 12,291, specifi-
cally states that it does not displace any statutory requirements the agencies 
otherwise face.13
In its memorandum concluding that Executive Order 12,291 did not un-
constitutionally interfere with other agencies’ prerogatives, the Department 
of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel emphasized that the Executive Order 
did not undo agencies’ obligations under existing law, including congres-
sional enactments: 
 
[I]t is clear that the President’s exercise of supervisory powers must con-
form to legislation enacted by Congress.  In issuing directives to govern 
the Executive Branch, the President may not, as a general proposition, re-
quire or permit agencies to transgress boundaries set by Congress. . . . 
 . . . This Office has often taken the position that the President may 
consult with those having statutory decision-making responsibilities, and 
may require them to consider statutorily relevant matters that he deems 
appropriate, as long as the President does not divest the officer of ultimate 
statutory authority. . . . 
. . . The Order [E.O. 12,291] does not empower the Director [of OMB] . . . 
to displace the relevant agencies in discharging their statutory functions or 
in assessing and weighing the costs and benefits of proposed actions. . . .  
[The Director’s] power of consultation would not . . . include authority to 
reject an agency’s ultimate judgment, delegated to it by law, that potential 
benefits outweigh costs, that priorities under the statute compel a particu-
lar course of action, or that adequate information is available to justify 
regulation. . . .14
Likewise, OIRA’s first Administrator, James C. Miller III, testified be-
fore Congress that: 
 
President Reagan’s Executive order imposes requirements on the agencies 
only “to the extent permitted by law” and only to the extent that its terms 
would not “conflict with deadlines imposed by statute or by judicial or-
der.”  The limited application of [Executive Order 12,291] is a crucial 
point, one that insures [its] legality and the legality of actions pursuant to 
[it].15
 
 13. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,735; Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. 
Reg. at 13,198. 
 
 14. Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Inves-
tigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 154-58 (1981) (memoran-
dum of David Stockman, Director, Office of Management and Budget). 
 15. Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Inves-
tigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 46 (1981) (statement of 
James C. Miller III, Administrator, Office of Management and Budget). 
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From the beginning, therefore, it has been clear that, in reviewing the regu-
latory initiatives of its sister agencies, OIRA may not interfere with the 
agencies’ compliance with statutory directives. 
In the past several years, OIRA has become increasingly involved in 
agency rulemaking proceedings.  In September 2001, John Graham, 
OIRA’s Administrator, sent a memorandum to the heads of all federal 
agencies, signaling his intent to use OIRA’s oversight authority under Ex-
ecutive Order 12,866 in a variety of new ways.16  Graham noted that he 
would disapprove regulations that did not jibe with the cost-benefit frame-
work of Executive Order 12,866.17  OIRA has made good on this promise.  
In a 2003 report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded 
that OIRA “can have a significant—if not determinative—effect on a broad 
array of federal regulations . . . .” 18 According to GAO, between June 2001 
and July 2002, “the primary effect of OIRA’s suggestions was to delay or 
eliminate certain regulatory provisions that were included in the draft rules 
as submitted to OIRA” for six of the fourteen EPA rules specifically 
changed.19  Moreover, GAO found that twenty-four of the twenty-five rules 
it examined in its report were weakened during the OIRA review process.20  
The unidirectional nature of OIRA’s role in regulatory affairs led one scho-
lar to call cost-benefit analysis in OIRA’s hands a “one-way ratchet, able to 
stand still to be sure, but only capable of moving in one direction when it 
does function as a tool having some substantive effect, that of making regu-
lation less stringent.”21  Indeed, when agencies have offered proposals that 
involve deregulation rather than increased regulation, OIRA has not re-
quired a cost-benefit analysis.22
 
 16. Memorandum from John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Info. & Reg. Affairs 
(Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/oira_review-
process.html. 
 
 17. Id. (“[T]he Administrator may decide to send a letter to the agency that returns the 
rule for reconsideration.”). 
 18. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF 
AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03929.pdf. 
 19. Id. at 76. 
 20. David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2006).  
 21. Id. 
 22. Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush Ad-
ministration, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,485, 10,488 (2004) (“Thus, when the Bush Administra-
tion relaxed requirements for power plants and other facilities under the new source review 
(NSR) program, it declined to conduct an economic analysis of the consequences of its ac-
tions.”). 
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B.  Technology-Based Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The Clean Water Act,23 passed in 1972 and amended in 1977, is the 
leading U.S. law protecting the nation’s surface waters from pollution and 
other threats to their physical, biological, and chemical integrity.  Several 
other federal statutes preceded the Clean Water Act; those statutes, in the 
words of the Senate Committee on Public Works, were “inadequate in 
every vital aspect.”24  The Clean Water Act departed from previous legisla-
tion in several important ways.  For present purposes, the most important 
innovation was the transition from water-quality based standards to tech-
nology-based standards for controlling water pollution.25
The Clean Water Act relies on technology-based regulation as the strate-
gy of first resort for cleaning up the nation’s waters.  Technology-based 
regulation is regulation that attempts to protect the environment through the 
use of some version of the best available technology for controlling pollu-
tion.
 
26  The main advantage of technology-based regulation, compared to 
water-quality based regulation, is that one need not resolve all of the con-
tentious scientific issues surrounding exactly what levels of pollution are 
bad for the waters before one proceeds to regulate.27  To be sure, depending 
on the specific formulation of the “best available technology” requirement 
in place, the level of pollution reduction can be relevant to the technology-
based inquiry.  But under the Clean Water Act, the inquiry into the effluent 
reduction level achieved by various technologies has historically been very 
limited.  In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle,28 for example, the D.C. Circuit 
held that the consideration of “effluent reduction benefits” called for by the 
Clean Water Act29 did not require EPA to conduct a fine-grained cost-
benefit analysis of technology requirements before imposing such require-
ments on the relevant industry.30
Ever since Congress passed the Clean Water Act, industry groups regu-
lated by the Act have tried to convert the Act’s technology-based standards 
into cost-benefit standards.  Early on, the Weyerhaeuser litigation sought to 
require cost-benefit analysis in setting technology-based standards for the 
 
 
 23. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2006). 
 24. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 7 (1971), as reprinted in S. COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 93RD 
CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 
1972, at 1425 (Comm. Print 1973). 
 25. See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 26. See, e.g., id. at 185 (citing to section 306 of the Clean Water Act). 
 27. Id. at 184. 
 28. 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 29. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(b) (West 2006). 
 30. Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1048. 
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pulp and paper industry.31  Other cases involved—and rejected—similar 
arguments.32  In the mid-1990s, Congress flirted with statutory amend-
ments that would have required cost-benefit analysis of any rule costing 
more than $25 million; the amendments did not pass.33  At about the same 
time, Congress also considered legislation implementing Newt Gingrich’s 
“Contract with America,” which would have required cost-benefit analysis 
for major health, safety, and environmental rules.34
Thus, from the earliest days of the Clean Water Act, EPA, the courts, 
and Congress have agreed that the Act’s technology-based requirements are 
not to be based on cost-benefit analysis.  Efforts to import cost-benefit 
analysis into the Act’s basic structure have failed.  Yet, some of the Act’s 
technology-based provisions require consideration of both the economic 
costs and the “effluent reduction benefits” of regulations.
  This legislation, too, 
failed to pass. 
35
Cost-benefit analysis is different from technology-based regulation in 
three principal ways.  First, cost-benefit analysis is indifferent to whether, 
at the end of the day, any regulation whatsoever is imposed on the actors 
subject to the relevant law.  If the costs of regulation are too high in rela-
tion to the benefits, then the cost-benefit analyst will recommend rejecting 
the regulation.
  What is the dif-
ference between these two regulatory approaches? 
36  Technology-based regulation, on the other hand, takes it 
as a given that entities subject to the law will be subject to some form of 
pollution control requirements when all is said and done; the only question 
is how stringent those requirements will be.37
 
 31. Id. at 1036. 
  Cost-benefit analysis is ag-
nostic on the question of whether regulation should proceed; technology-
based regulation is not. 
 32. See, e.g., Tex. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. U.S. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 936 n.9 (5th Cir. 1998); 
B.P. Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 66 F.3d 784, 799-800 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing CPC 
Int’l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1341-42 (8th Cir. 1976)). 
 33. H.R. 961, 104th Cong. § 324(a)(1)(B) (as referred in the Senate, May 19, 1995, ver-
sion 4).  The bill died in committee. 
 34. H.R. 9, 104th Cong. §§ 401-61 (as referred in the Senate, Mar. 10, 1995, version 5). 
 35. See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1285(j)(2)(D), 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314(b)(1)(B), 1316(b)(1)(B) 
(West 2006). 
 36. The rule on cooling water intake structures, for example, allows a conclusion that no 
new regulatory requirements are appropriate if a site-specific cost-benefit analysis shows 
that costs are significantly greater than benefits.  See 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(5)(ii) (2006). 
 37. Two narrow exceptions to this principle exist for situations in which pollution con-
trol improvements are physically impossible or would force widespread plant shutdowns. 
See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety Protec-
tion: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 9 (2005). 
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A second major difference between cost-benefit analysis and technolo-
gy-based regulation is that cost-benefit analysis requires quantification and 
monetization of the factors relevant to a decision, whereas technology-
based regulation does not.38  Unlike cost-benefit analysis, technology-
based regulation does not depend on obtaining numbers for extremely spe-
cific aspects of a given regulatory program (such as exactly which fish spe-
cies are killed by a particular cooling water intake structure, and in what 
numbers, and at what ages).39  Nor does it require the translation of such 
numbers into dollar figures.  This step—”monetizing” regulatory bene-
fits—is at once the most controversial and most distinctive feature of cost-
benefit analysis.40
A third feature of cost-benefit analysis that distinguishes it from tech-
nology-based regulation is more obscure, but very important.  Modern cost-
benefit analysts insist upon “discounting” both the future costs and future 
benefits of the regulation.
 
41  This is a normal procedure for future financial 
costs.  Discounting allows the analyst to determine, based on estimates of 
prevailing rates of return on financial investments, what money in the fu-
ture will be worth compared to money today.  But cost-benefit analysts ap-
ply the same technique to non-monetary future goods (such as, in the cool-
ing-water context, fish and wildlife protected in the future through control 
technologies).  The basic idea is that future events are not as important as 
present events.42
In these ways—agnosticism about whether regulation occurs, and quan-
tification, monetization, and discounting of costs and benefits—cost-benefit 
analysis is very different from the technology-based regulation of the Clean 
Water Act. 
  Thus, in the present setting, the fish of the future are 
worth appreciably less than today’s fish.  Technology-based regulation in-
cludes nothing remotely resembling the technique of discounting. 
 
 38. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Accidental Environmentalist: Judge Posner on Ca-
tastrophic Thinking, 94 GEO. L.J. 833, 836-37 (2006) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, 
CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004)). 
 39. See, e.g., National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Proposed Regulations 
to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facili-
ties, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122, 17,122-140 (proposed Apr. 9, 2002) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 9, 122-25). 
 40. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 61-90 (2004). 
 41. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, at 33-34 (2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (requiring agencies conducting cost-
benefit analyses to discount future costs and benefits at seven and three percent per year re-
spectively). 
 42. Id. at 32. 
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C.  OIRA, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Phase II Rulemaking 
OIRA has reviewed and directed the revision of numerous Clean Water 
Act rules in recent years.  Here, I focus on EPA’s rule on cooling water in-
take structures at existing power plants, known to aficionados as the “Phase 
II” rule because a rule on intake structures at new facilities (the “Phase I” 
rule) came first.43  For cooling purposes, power plants and other industrial 
facilities draw in staggering amounts of water from adjacent water bo-
dies.44  Equally staggering numbers of fish are killed when they are either 
trapped (“impinged”) at the inlet to these cooling water intake structures or 
drawn into the machinery of the structures themselves (“entrained”).45  The 
Phase II rule is based on section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, which aims 
to limit the large-scale fish kills that result from drawing huge amounts of 
cooling water into power plants.46
First, numerous important changes to EPA’s initial proposal and to its 
proposed final rule were made during OIRA’s review and at OIRA’s beh-
est.  For example, when the rule first went to OIRA for review (before be-
ing formally proposed), it required the largest and most harmful plants to 
employ “closed-cycle recirculating cooling,” the most effective technology 
for avoiding the fish kills just described.
  The rule has a long and complicated 
history.  I highlight just two general points here. 
47  OIRA ultimately removed this 
requirement during its review.48  OIRA also inserted a “compliance alterna-
tive,” allowing a facility to escape new regulatory requirements based on a 
site-specific cost-benefit analysis showing that the costs of regulation were 
not worth the benefits. 49
 
 43. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations To Establish 
Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 41,576 (July 9, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122-25). 
 
 44. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 45. Id. 
 46. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1326(b) (West 2006). 
 47. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EPA-HQ-OW-2002-0049, REVIEW DRAFT FOR THE 
PROPOSED SECTION 316(B) RULE FOR LARGE COOLING WATER INTAKE STRUCTURES AT 
EXISTING POWER GENERATING FACILITIES, DCN 4-4005, at 72 (Dec. 28, 2001) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter OMB REVIEW DRAFT] (proposing to require closed-cycle cooling at fif-
ty-nine plants). 
 48. Compare id., with National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Proposed 
Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Ex-
isting Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122, 17,158 (proposed Apr. 9, 2002) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 9, 122-25) (rejecting requirement of closed-cycle cooling at these facilities based 
on comparison of monetized, incremental costs and benefits). 
 49. Compare OMB REVIEW DRAFT, supra note 47, at 93-95 (declining to propose a 
compliance alternative based on site-specific cost-benefit analysis, due to administrative 
costs and regulatory uncertainties created by such an alternative), with OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EPA-HQ-OW-2002-0049, SECTION 316(B) PHASE II PROPOSED RULE SUMMARY OF 
CHRISTENSEN_HEINZERLING 2/3/2011  10:22 PM 
2006] STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 109 
Second, the cost-benefit analysis insisted upon by OIRA featured the 
characteristics of cost-benefit analysis described above—agnosticism about 
whether any regulatory requirements will ultimately be imposed, and quan-
tification, monetization, and discounting of the costs and benefits of regula-
tion.50  On agnosticism, the site-specific cost-benefit compliance alterna-
tive allows a facility to avoid regulation altogether if the costs of control 
technology are “significantly greater” than the benefits.51
As for monetization, EPA struggled to attach a dollar figure to the bene-
fits of this regulation.  In the end, EPA could monetize only the benefits of 
saving the fish that, with the protections of this rule in place, will survive 
the hazards of cooling water intake structures, only later to be caught by 
commercial or recreational fishers.
 
52  EPA was unable to attach any sepa-
rate dollar figure whatsoever to the benefits of 98.2 percent of the aquatic 
organisms saved by this rule.53  EPA could not identify the dollar value of 
the “nonuse” benefits provided by these organisms (such as ecological val-
ues).54  The final rule lists the benefits that EPA was unable to monetize.55
EPA used the discounting technique in two ways.  First, EPA assumed 
(without elaboration) that compliance costs would likely be incurred ap-
proximately one year before the relevant control technology would be op-
erational and thus begin saving fish.
 
56  EPA discounted the monetary value 
of the fish saved over this one year between the imposition of costs and the 
realization of benefits.57  Second, EPA observed that the fish saved by the 
relevant control technologies would not have been caught by commercial 
or recreational fishers until they had reached some appropriate level of ma-
turity.58
 
MAJOR CHANGES DURING INTERAGENCY REVIEW, DCN 4-4019 2 (May 23, 2002) (on file 
with author) (noting that this cost-benefit variance was added at OIRA’s behest). 
  EPA thought the benefits of the Phase II rule would not accrue un-
til the date on which the fish saved by the rule would otherwise have been 
 50. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. 
 51. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(5)(ii) (2006) (site-specific cost-benefit determination 
“may conclude that design and construction technologies, operational measures, and/or res-
toration measures in addition to those already in place are not justified because the costs 
would be significantly greater than the benefits” at a particular facility). 
 52. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations to Estab-
lish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, supra 
note 43, at 41,660-61. 
 53. Id. at 41,661 (“The Agency’s direct use valuation does not account for the benefits 
from the remaining 98.2% of the age 1 equivalent aquatic organisms estimated to be pro-
tected nationally under today’s rule.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 41,662. 
 56. Id. at 41,658. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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caught.59  For this reason, EPA discounted the fish-saving benefits of the 
rule for one or more years, depending on “the time of [the] ultimate harv-
est” of the relevant fish.60  Discounting in this manner reduced the esti-
mated benefits of saving fish through this rule by as much as thirty-four 
percent.61
II.  INTERPRETIVE ERRORS 
 
In its Phase II rulemaking, EPA erred by converting a technology-based 
regulatory regime into a cost-benefit regime.  Two important aspects of the 
final rule rest on EPA’s unlawful interpretation of the statute: the rejection 
of a provision requiring closed-cycle cooling structures at the largest and 
most environmentally damaging facilities,62 and the embrace of a “com-
pliance alternative” based on site-specific cost-benefit analysis.63  EPA’s 
substitution of a cost-benefit regime for a technology-based regime con-
flicts with the plain meaning of the Clean Water Act and thus is due no de-
ference.64  Even if the Act were ambiguous on the relevant issues, EPA’s 
interpretation of the statute would not deserve deference.65  By caving in to 
the statutory interpretation foisted on it by OIRA,66 EPA earned the lesser 
measure of deference recognized in recent Supreme Court cases that nar-
rowed the instances in which Chevron’s broad deference is available.67
A.  The Plain Meaning of Section 316(b) 
 
The cooling water tower case turns on the proper interpretation of sec-
tion 316(b) of the Clean Water Act.  As interpreted, section 316(b) will de-
termine the appropriateness of, among other things, EPA’s performance 
standards for cooling water intake structures and its endorsement of a 
“compliance alternative” based on site-specific cost-benefit analysis.  EPA 
explicitly based its rejection of closed-cycle cooling at the largest and most 
harmful facilities, and its “compliance alternative” using site-specific cost-
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EPA-HQ-OW-2002-0049, MEMO TO PHASE II 
DOCKET, DISCOUNTING RECREATIONAL AND COMMERCIAL FISHING BENEFITS, DCN 5-2390 3 
(Apr. 15, 2003) (on file with author). 
 62. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. 
 63. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 64. See infra Part II.A. 
 65. See infra Part II.B. 
 66. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 238 (2001) (holding that judi-
cial responses to administrative actions must continue to distinguish between those that are 
entitled to Chevron deference and those that are entitled to Skidmore deference).   
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benefit analysis, on its view that section 316(b) authorizes cost-benefit ba-
lancing.  EPA explained that it interpreted the phrase “best technology 
available” under section 316(b) to require “best technology available com-
mercially at an economically practicable cost.”68 EPA viewed economic 
practicability as including “a consideration of the relationship of costs to 
environmental benefits” and requiring “some reasonable relationship be-
tween the cost of cooling water intake structure control technology and the 
environmental benefits associated with its use.”69  EPA then rejected 
closed-cycle cooling because it was “not determined to be the most cost-
effective approach on a national basis.”70  In reaching this conclusion, EPA 
did nothing more or less than a cost-benefit analysis.71  Similarly, EPA also 
based its cost-benefit “compliance alternative” on its view that section 
316(b) authorizes cost-benefit balancing.72
The language of a statute is the starting point for statutory interpreta-
tion.
  Thus, the validity of both of 
these features of the rule depends on the validity of EPA’s interpretation of 
the Act. 
73
Any standard established pursuant to section 1311 [301] of this title or 
  In the midst of the Clean Water Act’s jumble of acronyms, section 
316(b) offers refreshingly plainspoken terms.  Here is the provision in its 
entirety: 
 
 68. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations To Establish 
Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, supra note 
43, at 41,604. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 41,607. 
 71. EPA does not explain why it concluded that closed-cycle cooling was not cost-
effective.  (This lack of explanation is in itself a problem.)  In its final draft for OMB re-
view, in discussing cost-effectiveness, EPA simply stated that “[t]he incremental social 
costs of [closed-cycle cooling at the largest and most harmful facilities] relative to the pro-
posed option ($686 million) significantly outweigh the incremental benefits ($299 million).”  
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EPA-HQ-OW-2002-0049, REVIEW DRAFT OF PROPOSED 
SECTION 316(B) RULE FOR LARGE COOLING WATER INTAKE STRUCTURES AT EXISTING POWER 
GENERATING FACILITIES 7-30 (Dec. 22, 2003) (on file with author); see also National Pollu-
tant Discharge Elimination System—Proposed Regulations to Establish Requirements for 
Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, supra note 48, at 17,158 (of-
fering same kind of analysis, but with figures of $413 million for incremental costs and 
$146 million for incremental benefits).  EPA’s analysis here is cost-benefit analysis; the 
agency simply compares the results of two different cost-benefit analyses, for two different 
regulatory options. 
 72. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations to Establish 
Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, supra  
note 43, at 41,603 (“EPA decided to use a comparison of a facilities costs to the benefits of 
meeting the performance standards at the facility (a “cost-benefit test”) as another basis for 
obtaining site-specific determination of BTA to minimize adverse environmental impact.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166 (2004). 
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section 1316 [306] of this title and applicable to a point source shall re-
quire that the location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water 
intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing ad-
verse environmental impact.74
The key phrase of the provision is the one describing the required tech-
nology: “the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmen-
tal impact.”
 
75  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “mi-
nimize” as “to reduce to the smallest possible number, degree, or extent.”76  
The use of the term “minimize” in environmental statutes has been strictly 
interpreted by the courts.  For example, the D.C. Circuit construed the term 
“minimized” in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act77 to require 
that EPA reduce the targeted harm to the greatest possible extent.78
EPA’s conversion of section 316(b) to a cost-benefit regime cannot be 
squared with this unambiguous statutory language.  A cost-benefit regime 
does not minimize adverse environmental impacts; a cost-benefit regime 
balances costs against benefits in deciding what level of environmental im-
pact is acceptable.
  Thus, 
section 316(b) charges EPA with reducing adverse environmental impacts 
from cooling water intake structures to the lowest possible degree. 
79  A regime like section 316(b), which aims to minimize 
environmental impacts, explicitly favors environmental protection.  Cost-
benefit analysis does not do this.  Indeed, given the difficulty of developing 
meaningful numbers for the benefits of environmental protection,80
Section 316(b)’s cross-reference to sections 301 and 306 of the Clean 
Water Act fortifies this conclusion.  The Second Circuit has said that this 
cross-reference: 
 cost-
benefit analysis actually tips the scales against environmental protection.  
This is not the regime created by the language of minimization in section 
316(b). 
is an invitation to look to section 306 for guidance in discerning what fac-
tors Congress intended the EPA to consider in determining the ‘best tech-
nology available.’ . . . Because section 316(b) refers to sections 301 and 
306 but provides a different standard . . . we think it is permissible for the 
EPA to look to those sections for guidance but to decide that not every 
 
 74. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1326(b) (West 2006). 
 75. Id. 
 76. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1438 (1986). 
 77. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6924(m)(1) (West 2006). 
 78. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. U.S. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 361 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (“To ‘minimize’ something is, to quote the Oxford English Dictionary, to ‘reduce [it] 
to the smallest possible amount, extent, or degree.’”). 
 79. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. 
 80. See, e.g., supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. 
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statutory directive contained therein is applicable to the Rule.81
As the court makes clear, section 316(b) describes a different standard—
the minimization of adverse environmental effects—than the standards 
contemplated by sections 301 and 306.
 
82  In looking at sections 301 and 
306 as guideposts to the meaning of “best technology available” under 
316(b), the special standard enunciated in section 316(b) for cooling water 
intake structures must be preserved.83
Sections 301 and 306 establish an array of technology-based standards.  
Among these are the “best available technology economically achieva-
ble,”
 
84 the “best practicable control technology currently available,”85 the 
“best conventional pollutant control technology,”86 and the “best available 
demonstrated control technology.”87  Linguistically, the technology-based 
standards cited in sections 301 and 306 that are closest to the “best technol-
ogy available” of section 316(b) are the standards for new sources under 
section 306 (“best available demonstrated control technology”)88 and for 
existing sources under section 301(b)(2)(A) (“best available technology 
economically achievable”).89  If Congress had wanted EPA to set standards 
for cooling water intake structures based on the “best practicable” control 
technology, or the “best conventional” control technology, it could easily 
have done so.  It did so in other provisions of the very same statute—
provisions cited in section 316(b) itself.90
The importance of this point goes well beyond semantics, for the specif-
ic categorization of control technologies under the Clean Water Act ushers 
in a cascade of regulatory consequences.  Most important for present pur-
poses, the criteria for choosing the required technology change considera-
bly from one technology-based standard to another.  In particular, the con-
  Instead, in section 316(b), Con-
gress used language remarkably similar to that used to describe the tech-
nology-based requirements under section 306 and 301(b)(2)(A). 
 
 81. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 186-87 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 82. Id. at 187. 
 83. Id. 
 84. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (West 2006). 
 85. § 1311(b)(1)(A). 
 86. § 1311(b)(2)(E). 
 87. § 1316(a)(1). 
 88. Id. 
 89. § 1311(b)(2)(A).  This standard applies to existing sources that involve pollutants 
other than “conventional” pollutants.  See id. (noting that section 1311 applies to pollutants 
identified in subsections (C), (D), and (F), which include toxic pollutants and pollutants that 
are not conventional pollutants).  Cooling water intake structures involve neither toxic nor 
conventional pollutants. 
 90. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (“best practicable”); § 1311(b)(2)(E) (“best conventional”). 
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sideration of costs in relation to benefits is explicitly allowed in determin-
ing the “best practicable control technology”91 and the “best conventional 
pollutant control technology.”92  The relationship between costs and bene-
fits is not one of the factors listed as relevant in choosing the best available 
technology under sections 30693 or 301(b)(2)(A) of the Clean Water Act.94  
Thus, neither of the provisions that bear the closest linguistic resemblance 
to section 316(b) authorize EPA to consider the relationship between costs 
and benefits in choosing the requisite technology.  The explicit mention of 
cost-benefit comparisons in some provisions of the statute, and the lack of 
mention of that comparison in other provisions, strongly indicates that 
Congress did not mean to allow that comparison under the provisions that 
do not mention it.95
Thus, EPA may not, consistent with the unambiguous meaning of sec-
tion 316(b), convert this provision into a cost-benefit regime.  Congress 
could easily have charged EPA with considering the relationship between 
costs and benefits in setting standards under section 316(b).  Congress 
could have done this indirectly, by specifying that the standards should re-
quire use of the “best practicable” or “best conventional” control technolo-
gy (which would have brought with it consideration of the cost-benefit rela-
tionship), or directly, by using the same kind of language Congress used to 
describe the factors to be considered in setting certain technology-based 
standards.
 
96
In creating a site-specific “compliance alternative” based on cost-benefit 
analysis, EPA also ignored explicit statutory language ruling out such an 
alternative.  Congress painstakingly elaborated different rules for variances 
 
 
 91. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (directing EPA to consider factors including “the total cost of appli-
cation of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such 
application”). 
 92. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (directing EPA to consider factors including “the reasonableness of 
the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent re-
duction benefits derived”).  Even here, and with respect to best practicable control technolo-
gy, however, EPA has not relied upon the kind of formal, quantified, and monetized cost-
benefit analysis that formed the basis of its decisions in this rulemaking proceeding.  See, 
e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 passim (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 93. § 1316(b)(1)(B) (referring only to costs, but not to benefits). 
 94. § 1314(b)(2)(A). 
 95. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 458 (2001) (“[T]he cost 
factor is both so indirectly related to public health and so full of potential for canceling the 
conclusions drawn from direct health effects that it would have been expressly men-
tioned . . . had Congress meant it to be considered.”). 
 96. Again, the language describing the factors relevant to identifying “best practicable” 
and “best conventional” control technology explicitly refers to the relationship between 
costs and benefits.  See §§ 1314(b)(1)(B), 1314(b)(4)(B). 
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in different circumstances.97  In only one kind of case—involving “bio-
chemical oxygen demand and pH from discharges . . . into deep waters of 
the territorial seas”—was modification of technology-based requirements 
allowed based on a cost-benefit balancing.98  The other provisions for va-
riances involve consideration of some combination of the kinds of factors 
the Second Circuit upheld in reviewing the variance allowed for new 
sources under section 316(b): a comparison of actual costs to the costs pre-
dicted during the rulemaking proceeding, “significant adverse impacts on 
local air quality,” “significant adverse impacts on local water resources 
other than impingement and entrainment,” and “significant adverse impacts 
on local energy markets.”99  In allowing a variance based on site-specific 
cost-benefit analysis for the existing sources covered by the Phase II rule, 
EPA went well beyond the narrow variance it allowed for new sources in 
the Phase I proceeding.100
EPA’s efforts to get around the clear meaning of section 316(b) are 
tinged with desperation.  EPA notes the linguistic similarity between the 
“best technology available” of section 316(b) and the “best available dem-
onstrated technology” of section 301.
 
101  EPA states that it therefore looked 
to that section (and the closely related section 304) “for guidance in deter-
mining the best technology available” under section 316(b).102
There are significant differences between section 316(b) and sections 301 
and 304. . . . In contrast to the effluent limitations provisions, the object of 
the ‘best technology available’ is explicitly articulated by reference to the 
receiving water: To minimize adverse environmental impact in the waters 
from which cooling water is withdrawn. . . . For this Phase II rulemaking, 
  Neverthe-
less, EPA asserts: 
 
 97. EPA’s decision to style the cost-benefit option a “compliance alternative” rather 
than a “variance” does not make the provisions of the Clean Water Act dealing with excep-
tions to technology-based standards—there styled “variances”—any less relevant. 
 98. § 1311(m)(1)(B). 
 99. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 192 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 100. The cost-benefit “compliance alternative” in this rule also goes beyond the Phase I 
variance in other ways: the Phase I variance more clearly placed the entire burden of justify-
ing a variance on the applicant; it required that the costs of a technology at a specific site be 
“wholly disproportionate to”—rather than “significantly greater than”—the costs EPA had 
assumed in writing the rule; and it did not provide that it was acceptable not to do anything 
in response to the rule if the costs were high enough in relation to the benefits.  Compare 40 
C.F.R. § 125.85(a)(2)-(3) (2006) (Phase I variance provision), with 40 C.F.R. § 
125.94(a)(5)(ii) (2006) (Phase II site-specific “compliance alternative” based on cost-benefit 
analysis). 
 101. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations To Establish 
Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, supra note 
43, at 41,582-83. 
 102. Id. 
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EPA therefore interprets CWA section 316(b) as authorizing EPA to con-
sider not only technologies but also their effects on and benefits to the wa-
ter from which the cooling water is withdrawn.103
This interpretation must underlie EPA’s deployment of the “cost-
effectiveness” test in rejecting closed-cycle cooling at the largest and most 
harmful facilities (since that test is but a refinement of the cost-benefit ba-
lancing EPA describes in this passage).  It also  forms the express basis of 
EPA’s embrace of a “compliance alternative” based on site-specific cost-
benefit analysis.
 
104
But the interpretation is absurd.  First, if EPA had indeed looked for 
“guidance” in sections 301 and 304 when it was interpreting section 
316(b), and done so responsibly, EPA would have found that cost-benefit 
balancing is foreclosed under section 316(b).  Second, to use the specific 
language of section 316(b) to enlarge EPA’s authority to conduct cost-
benefit balancing is bizarre.  As discussed above, several provisions of the 
Clean Water Act explicitly authorize the weighing of costs against bene-
fits.
 
105  As Weyerhaeuser makes clear, courts have not even interpreted 
these provisions as requiring the kind of formal cost-benefit analysis EPA 
required here.106  Thus, EPA must somehow argue that a provision requir-
ing it to “minimize adverse environmental impacts” is less environmentally 
protective (because it allows more relaxed regulatory standards under the 
rubric of formal cost-benefit analysis) than a provision that, like those in 
section 304, authorizes an informal comparison of economic costs and pol-
lution reduction benefits.  Although section 316(b) has an eye on the “ef-
fects on . . . the water from which the cooling water is withdrawn,”107  EPA 
is directed to minimize those effects, not to balance them against economic 
costs.108
In sum, EPA’s transformation of section 316(b) into a cost-benefit pro-
vision is inconsistent with the unambiguous meaning of that provision.  As 
next discussed, even if section 316(b) were ambiguous, the interpretation 
offered in EPA’s rule—at the direction of OIRA—would not deserve defe-
rence under Chevron. 
  EPA has read section 316(b) exactly backwards. 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 41,603-04. 
 105. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 106. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1046-47 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 107. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations To Establish 
Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, surpa note 
43, at 41,583. 
 108. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Chevron and OIRA 
For reasons just discussed, one cannot argue that section 316(b) is un-
ambiguous in the other direction; that is, that it unambiguously allows cost-
benefit analysis to serve as the criterion for choosing technologies under 
section 316(b), or that it unambiguously permits a compliance alternative 
based on site-specific cost-benefit analysis.  Even EPA appears to have 
conceded this point.  In the preamble to the final rule, the agency states that 
“neither the statute nor the legislative history requires a formal or informal 
cost-benefit assessment.”109
In recent years, the Supreme Court has refined its holding in Chevron by 
deciding that the degree of deference courts should give to agency interpre-
tations of ambiguous statutes depends on a wide array of factors.
 
110  The 
substantial deference afforded under Chevron111 to the agency charged with 
implementing a statute is, in other words, not automatically applicable 
whenever an agency offers an interpretation of a statute.112
[t]he fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute 
has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked 
to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative 
expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.  The ap-
proach has produced a spectrum of judicial responses, from great respect 
at one end, to near indifference at the other.
  Rather, the 
Court held in United States v. Mead Corporation, 
113
The Court went on to quote Justice Jackson’s opinion in Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co.:
 
114
The weight [accorded to an administrative judgment] in a particular case 
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validi-
ty of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.
 
115
The situation here calls for the application of Mead, not Chevron.  First 
and foremost, Chevron deference is due only to the agency responsible for 
implementing the statute in question, or, in Chevron’s words, to the agency 
 
 
 109. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final Regulations To Establish 
Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, supra note 
43, at 41,604 (emphasis added). 
 110. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). 
 111. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 112. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 200-01 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 113. 533 U.S. at 228. 
 114. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 115. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). 
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“entrusted to administer” the relevant statute.116  Moreover, as the Supreme 
Court held in Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 
when two different executive agencies clash, the agency with the greatest 
degree of implementing authority under the relevant statute deserves defe-
rence to its interpretation.117  EPA is that agency in the case of the Clean 
Water Act.118
The paper trail in the cooling water tower case makes clear that OIRA 
foisted on EPA an interpretation of the Clean Water Act that EPA itself had 
not developed.
 
119  OIRA is not the agency charged with implementing the 
Clean Water Act.  Indeed, the Act does not mention OIRA; it does not give 
OIRA even the tiniest role in implementing the Act.120  In this way, there-
fore, the cooling water tower case is even more straightforward than Mar-
tin.  In Martin, the agency that offered a statutory interpretation that con-
flicted with the interpretation of the agency given primary responsibility for 
implementing the statute at least had some responsibilities under the sta-
tute.121  OIRA has no responsibilities under the Clean Water Act.  EPA 
should not be given Chevron deference for an interpretation that simply 
bends to the will of a sister agency.122
Another feature of the Phase II rulemaking also supports application of 
the Mead rather than Chevron standard of review for EPA’s interpretative 
choices.  The interpretive choices I have referenced here—such as the 
adoption of a “net benefits” standard and the embrace of a site-specific 
cost-benefit test—were made abruptly, in response to pressure from OIRA, 
 
 
 116. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.  
 117. 499 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1991); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914-22 
(2006) (declining to give Chevron deference to Attorney General’s interpretation of the 
Controlled Substances Act, as Act did not delegate to the Attorney General the authority to 
make medical judgments). 
 118. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(d) (West 2006) (“[T]he Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency . . . shall administer this chapter.”); § 1316(b)(1)(B) (“[T]he Administra-
tor shall propose and publish regulations establishing Federal standards of performance for 
new sources . . . .”). 
 119. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text; see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EPA-HQ-OW-2002-0049, FORM FOR COMPLIANCE WITH E.O. 12866 DOCKET 
REQUIREMENTS, DCN 6-5051 9 (Mar. 10, 2005) (on file with author) (noting that OMB had 
advocated adding the “clarification that comparison of costs with benefits is an important 
component of economic practicability”). 
 120. Cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(ii) (West 2006) (Clean Air Act expressly refers to 
OMB regulatory review process in requiring that drafts of proposed rules submitted for this 
process be placed in the relevant rule’s public docket). 
 121. 499 U.S. at 152-53. 
 122. Cf. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. U.S. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 365-66 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989) (finding that EPA did not adequately explain the interpretation of the statute 
where it referred to representatives’ post-enactment letter setting forth their own interpreta-
tion of the statute, as if their interpretation controlled EPA’s view of the statute). 
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rather than with careful deliberation and application of EPA’s unique ex-
pertise.123  The care with which an agency makes an interpretive choice is 
another factor in deciding how much deference to afford that choice.124
Thus, not only OIRA’s aggressive involvement in EPA’s interpretive 
choices, but also the agency’s lack of care in making these choices, counsel 
in favor of withholding Chevron deference to EPA’s interpretation in the 
rule on cooling water towers. 
 
Basic principles of administrative law support this conclusion.  A be-
drock principle of administrative law holds that an agency may not offer 
post hoc rationalizations for its regulatory choices.125  This principle is, in 
fact, reflected in the decision of Mead itself.  There, the Court strongly 
suggested that an agency may not support an interpretive choice through 
lawyers’ arguments made after the interpretation has been settled.126  In the 
rule on cooling water towers, EPA’s lawyers were essentially put in the po-
sition of appellate lawyers asked to defend an agency’s pre-existing inter-
pretive choice.  EPA was given its marching orders by OIRA, and then 
EPA had to supply the legal rationale for the changes instigated by EPA.127  
This is not the way agencies are supposed to go about interpreting the sta-
tutes they administer.128
Finally, the theoretical reasons for Chevron deference do not apply in a 
situation where an expert agency like EPA takes its interpretive directions 
from OIRA.  The Chevron Court itself justified deference to agency inter-
pretations by noting that agencies’ have greater expertise and political ac-
countability than courts.
 
129
 
 123. See supra notes 
  The same comparison is true for agencies like 
EPA and OIRA.  OIRA’s special expertise lies neither in science nor in 
control technologies—two basic underpinnings of EPA’s regulatory deci-
sions.  In addition, when EPA makes a decision based on what OIRA has 
told it to do, political accountability is lacking; Administrator Johnson, not 
47-49 and accompanying text. 
 124. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). 
 125. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). 
 126. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (noting that the Court showed “near indifference” to an agen-
cy interpretation that appeared in a litigation brief in Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 
488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988)); Mead, 533 U.S. at 238 n.19. 
 127. See supra Part II.B. 
 128. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1971) (declining to 
defer to the Comptroller General’s statutory interpretation where he “adopted no expressly 
articulated position at the administrative level as to the meaning and impact of the [relevant] 
provisions” and noting that although appellate counsel had offered such a position, “[i]t is 
the administrative official and not appellate counsel who possesses the expertise that can 
enlighten and rationalize the search for the meaning and intent of Congress”). 
 129. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 
(1984). 
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Administrator Graham (or his successor), will take the heat for what EPA 
ultimately does.  Yet, responsibility properly lies with OIRA, not with 
EPA. 
The lack of accountability is made more pointed still by a peculiar posi-
tion EPA’s lawyers have taken in the case involving cooling water intake 
structures.  EPA’s lawyers have argued to the Second Circuit that the doc-
uments showing what EPA did in response to OIRA’s demands are not part 
of the administrative record and ought not be considered by the court in its 
review of EPA’s decision.130
CONCLUSION 
  In essence, EPA’s lawyers propose that the 
very documents that show why EPA did what it did in this rule are the very 
documents the court cannot consider in reviewing the rule.  Such a position 
virtually guarantees confusion about who is accountable for the rule’s re-
sults. 
OIRA’s increasingly aggressive role in controlling agency action is so 
far the biggest administrative law story of the new century.  One part of the 
story is OIRA’s role in shaping agencies’ interpretations of the laws they 
administer.  In the case of the regulation of cooling water intake structures 
under the Clean Water Act, OIRA fundamentally changed the regulatory 
framework under which EPA was operating.  OIRA’s pointed involvement 
in this rulemaking proceeding, and in others like it, eliminates any argu-
ment for interpretive deference under Chevron. 
 
 130. Combined Reply in Support of EPA’s Motion to Strike Portions of Briefs That Rely 
Upon Material Outside of the Administrative Record and in Opposition to Petitioners’ 
Cross-Motions to Supplement the Record at 10-17, Surfrider Found. v. U.S. EPA, No. 04-
6692 (2d Cir. January 20, 2006) (on file with the author). 
